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I. INTRODUCTION
Contract lore consists of "'traditional beliefs' about contract law
that 'contracts people'-judges, lawyers, and scholars applying and
writing about contract law-employ so routinely and confidently that
the principles [demonstrate] how we perceive contract law today."'
* 0 2020 Robert A. Hfillman. Edwin H. Woodruff Professor of Law, Cornell Law
School. Thanks to the Milton and Eleanor Gould Research Fund for its support of this research.
Thanks also to Jeff Rachlinski for reading and commenting on a draft, and to Conor Cathey for
excellent research assistance.
1. Robert A. Hillman, Contract Lore, 27 J. CORP. L. 505, 505 (2002) [hereinafter
Hillman, Lore I]. Of course, lore describing law is not limited to contracts. See, e.g., Jonathan
R. Macey, The Central Role of Political Myth in Corporate Law 3 (Aug. 22, 2019)
(unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract-3435676 ("The thesis of this Article is
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Previously, I presented three illustrations of contract lore: first,
expectancy damages put the injured party in as good a position as if
there were no breach; second, the "reasons for a breach, whether
willful, negligent, or unavoidable, are irrelevant to the rules of
performance and remedies"; third, contract formation and
interpretation focus on the parties' intentions.2
None of these principles are factually or historically even close to
true and are nothing more than myths.3 For example, expectancy
damages rarely, if ever, make the injured party whole. Important
remedial rules, such as the obligation of injured parties to pay their
lawyers win or lose, the bar to the recovery of prejudgment interest, the
preclusion of unforeseeable and unquantifiable damages, and the high
bar to recover emotional distress damages,' mean that injured parties
usually recover well short of their lost expectancy.'
Courts also pay close attention to the nature of a breach, whether
willful, negligent, or unavoidable, in determining liability and
formulating remedies.6 For example, the degree of willfulness of a
breach in construction contracts helps courts determine whether to
measure damages based on the cost of repair or the diminution in
value.' The reasons for breach also constitute a factor in determining
the materiality of a breach.' Bad-faith breach of contract creates rights
that corporate law is based on a number of basic principles and assumptions that have neither
factual basis nor historical validity."); Roseanna Sommers, Commonsense Consent, 129 YALE
L.J. (forthcoming 2020) ("Scholars, judges, and treatises tend to parrot the canonical line that
'fraud destroys all consent,' but the case law paints a muddier picture." (internal footnote
omitted) (quoting Ganley Bros. v. Butler Bros. Bldg. Co., 212 N.W. 602, 603 (Minn. 1927)).
2. Hillman, Lore I, supra note 1, at 505-06.
3. In this Article, I use the term "myth" interchangeably with "lore," although there
may be some technical differences. A myth is "an unfounded or false notion." Myth, MERRIAM-
WEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/myth (last visited Mar.
22, 2020). And folklore is "an often unsupported notion, story, or saying that is widely
circulated." Folklore, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://www.meriam-webster.com/
dictionary/folklore (last visited Mar. 22, 2020). "A 'political myth' is a particular kind of
narrative that provides legitimacy to a particular facet of a legal system." Macey, supra note 1,
at 3 n. 1. "Generally, the term 'myth' refers to a belief that is (or was) held to be true . . . ." Id
at 4.
4. Hillman, Lore I, supra note 1, at 507-08.
5. Courts also ignore the sentimental value of performance. See, e.g., Carpel v. Saget
Studios, Inc., 326 F. Supp. 1331 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
6. Hillman, Lore I, supra note 1, at 509-10; Robert A. Hillman, The Future ofFault
in Contract Law, 52 DuQ. L. REv. 275, 275 (2014).
7. See, e.g., Groves v. John Wunder Co., 286 N.W. 235 (Minn. 1939).
8. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 241 (AM. LAwINST. 1981).
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in favor of the injured party that are not expressly set forth in the
contract.9
Despite recitation of the "rule" that contract law enforces the
intentions of the parties, actual intentions rarely matter in contract
decisions."o Instead, courts apply an objective theory of formation and
interpretation that enforces contracts based on apparent, not actual
intentions."
When pressed, most contracts people would admit all of this.12
Nevertheless, why do contracts people invoke these "traditional
beliefs" even though they are, in reality, nothing more than lore? I
reckoned that "contract lore represents contracts people's aspirations-
their strong preference for how contract law should operate if realities
did not preclude it."" Further, people tend to seek consistency in their
beliefs, which "leads them to believe things that are not true and to
avoid conflicting information."l4 As such, contract lore represents an
example of the psychological phenomenon of cognitive dissonance."
In this Article, I delve deeper into the phenomenon of contract
lore. I offer additional examples that focus on the contract lore of
consent in the context of standard-form contracting, "intention of the
parties" in the context of gaps in contracts, and the requirement of a
"bargained-for exchange" in the context of promise enforcement.16
Based on these examples, I don't abandon cognitive dissonance as one
explanation of contract lore, but I offer additional explanations and
show that context plays an important role in explaining contract lore."
My ultimate goal is to shed light on possible areas of contract law in
need of reform.'
9. Hillman, Lore I, supra note 1, at 509-10.
10. Id. at 510-12.
11. Id. at 511.
12. Corporate law evidences the same phenomenon: "[I]ntellectuals, academic
specialists and elites are likely to comprehend the lack of congruence between the world
described by these myths and the actual world in which corporations operate." Macey, supra
note 1, at 6.
13. Hillman, Lore I, supra note 1, at 515.
14. Id.
15. Id at 515-16; see infra notes 69-76 and accompanying text.
16. See infra Part II.
17. See infra Part Ill.
18. See infra Part IV.
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II. MORE EVIDENCE OF CONTRACT LORE
A. Consumers Consent o Their Standard Forms
Although many scholars are aware that consent is a rather hollow
construct in reference to consumer standard form contracts, especially
in the world of digital contracts, contracts people still cling to this
rationale for enforcing them.19 The reality is sadly different. Merchants
may create and present obtuse and lengthy standard forms and conjure
up questionable methods of acceptance in an environment in which few
consumers read their voluminous, overly technical forms.20 In such a
take-it-or-leave-it environment, merchants can fill the standard form
with one-sided terms, for example, that (1) relinquish privacy,
(2) call for automatic renewal, (3) allow for unilateral modification,
(4) provide for arbitration in distant venues, (5) deny class actions, and
(6) disclaim all liability despite making promises and representations
that would constitute warranties on merchants' websites.21 Some of
these terms may be particularly troublesome in e-commerce. For
example, licensors of software make representations and promises
about the quality of their software online that attract customers only to
disclaim the representations and promises in the subsequent standard
form.22
19. Contracts people often rely on Llewellyn's "blanket assent" theory. Karl Llewellyn
The Common Law Tradition: Deciding Appeals 370 (1960); see infra note 67 and
accompanying text.
20. In a recent article, Uri Benoliel and Shmuel I. Becher examined 500 of the most
popular websites' "sign-in-wrap agreements," to determine their "readability." Uri Benoliel &
Shmuel I. Becher, The Duty to Read the Unreadable, 60 B.C. L. REv. 2255, 2256 (2019). The
tests measured the average length of sentences and the average number of syllables per word.
Id. at 2272. Sign-in-wrap agreements, the authors determined, were as readable as academic
journal articles (and we all know how readable these are!). Id at 2277-78. The article reinforces
other studies highlighting the deficiencies of Internet agreements. See id. at 2290. See also
Shmuel I. Becher & Uri Benoliel, Sneak in Contracts: An Empirical and Legal Analysis of
Unilateral Modiication Clauses in Consumer Contracts, 55 GA. L. REv. (forthcoming 2020)
(unilateral change in terms).
21. See generally PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF SorrWARE CONTRACTS 116 (AM. LAW
INST. 2009) [hereinafter ALI SoFTwARE PRINCIPLES] (noting the use of unsavory terms by
merchants).
22. In an article on this subject, my coauthor and I reported that virtually all of the
websites and End User License Agreements (EULAs) we sampled made warranties on the
website and disclaimed them in their EULAs. Robert A. Hillman & Ibrahim Barakat,
Warranties and Disclaimers in the Electronic Age, 11 YALE J.L. & TECH. 1, 6 (2009). In part,
we argued for enhanced disclosure of disclaimers prior to a consumer downloading the
software or requiring a pop-up window that reveals the disclaimers at the time of the download.
Id. at 23-24.
MORE CONTRACT LORE
An important article by Professors Kar and Radin illustrates the
contradiction between lore (consumers consent o their standard forms)
and law (contract law enforces standard forms in the absence of
consumer consent).23 Kar and Radin warn that "assimilationists" try to
treat all boilerplate text as contract (and therefore necessarily the
subject of consent)
so long as it is delivered with actual or merely constructive "notice" to a
party who agrees to a more basic transaction. Assimilationists assume
that all boilerplate text serves the same essentially contractual function,
and they do not recognize the critical difference between terms that
parties cooperatively communicate and agree to during contract
formation and the increasingly copious boilerplate text that is merely
tacked onto that agreement but never read.24
Kar and Radin suggest replacing current law with what they refer
to as "shared meaning analysis."2 5 They ask courts to "imagine that all
of the written and digital text exchanged during contract formation is
converted into oral form and takes place in a face-to-face conversation
between the relevant parties."26 Courts should search for the "common
meaning" of the parties, based on "how parties produce shared
meanings through interpersonal linguistic exchange."2 7 One can
certainly debate whether their approach is a viable solution-I doubt it
(for reasons I explain later in this Article28)-but the article deftly
illustrates that the reality of standard-form contracting starkly departs
from the lore that consumers consent to their standard forms. 2 9
23. Robin Bradley Kar & Margaret Jane Radin, Pseudo-Contract andSharedMeaning
Analysis, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1135, 1138-40 (2019).
24. Id. at 1139-40.
25. Id. at 1142-43. The authors build on Paul Grice's analysis of the speaker/sentence
meaning distinction. Id at 1143-45 ("To help courts discern these shared meanings under
today's conditions, we add precision to traditional approaches by building on the linguistic
distinction, first treated rigorously by the philosopher of language Paul Grice, between what
sentences mean (including any sentences delivered in boilerplate text) and what people mean
when they use language to communicate with one another (including to form contracts).").
26. Id at 1167.
27. Id at 1143-44. The authors assert that their approach is "consistent with long-
standing approaches to contract interpretation, which are ground in a nuanced and careful
assessment of the common understandings that parties produce when they use language to form
contracts." Id. at 1143.
28. See infra notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
29. The authors consider other solutions to the problem of standard forms inadequate.
See Kar & Radin, supra note 23, at 1168-72.
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B. Contract Law Enforces the Intentions of the Parties
Previously (and earlier in this Article), I pointed out that the
parties' intentions often are irrelevant in judicial decisions under the
objective theory of contract formation and interpretation,
notwithstanding the contract lore that intentions form the basis for
contract enforcement.30 Another example of the intentions shibboleth
is that courts curiously rely on the "intention of the parties" rubric even
in cases involving stark contract gaps. Such gap cases are another
illustration of the division between lore (contract law enforces the
intentions of the parties) and law (contract law fills gaps in contracts
from various sources having little to do with actual intentions).
A recent United States Supreme Court case, M & G Polymers
USA, LLC v. Tackett best illustrates this division.31 The case considered
whether certain retired union employees were entitled to lifetime
healthcare benefits under their union's contract when the contract was
silent on the duration of the benefits.3 2 In fact, trial testimony showed
that drafting of the contract was "ill-informed and haphazard" and
interviews with lawyers involved in such negotiations showed that for
strategic reasons the parties purposely left a gap with respect to the
duration of the benefits.33 Each side feared the other would prevail on
the duration issue if it was raised and negotiated.34
At oral argument, members of the Supreme Court certainly agreed
that this was a gap case. "Justice Alito asked why the bargainers left the
[collective bargaining agreement] silent on the duration of healthcare
benefits."35 Justice Scalia then remarked, "I mean, this thing [the
duration issue] is obviously an important feature. Both sides knew it
was left unaddressed, so, you know, whoever loses deserves to lose for
casting this upon us when it could have been said very clearly in the
contract. Such an important feature."36
The Court, in a unanimous decision written by Justice Thomas,
faulted the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit for
30. Hillman, Lore I, supra note 1, at 510-12; supra note 11 and accompanying text.
31. 135 S. Ct. 926 (2015).
32. Id. at 930.
33. Robert A. Hillman, The Supreme Court's Application of "Ordinary Contract
Principles" to the Issue of the Duration of Retiree Healthcare Benefits: Perpetuating the
Interpretation/Gap-Filling Quagmire, 32 ABA J. LAB. & EMP. L. 299, 315-18 (2017)
[hereinafter Hillman, Supreme Court].
34. Id. at 317-18. I learned of the motive for leaving such gaps by talking to lawyers
involved in such disputes. These lawyers preferred to remain anonymous. Id. at 317 n. 162.




applying to the case certain inferences and presumptions first
enumerated in another Sixth Circuit case,37 which the Court believed
failed to constitute "ordinary principles of contract law."38 These
inferences and presumptions included that "retiree healthcare benefits
can be a form of deferred compensation; healthcare benefits likely last
while the former employee is a retiree; tying healthcare benefits to
pension benefits [that vest] suggests that healthcare benefits vest."3 9
The Court therefore reversed and remanded the Sixth Circuit's decision
that the employees were entitled to lifetime benefits for further
proceedings that employed what the Court thought were authentic
"ordinary contract principles."40
The Supreme Court's opinion is full of language indicating that
these "ordinary contract principles" were tools for finding the parties'
intentions.4 ' For example, Justice Thomas wrote that the Court must
apply "ordinary principles of contract law"42 and proceeded to invoke
the "parties' intentions" and the "plainly expressed intent" of the
agreement.43 The Court added that the Sixth Circuit's use of inferences
"distort[ed] the attempt 'to ascertain the intention of the parties."'
And further, "[w]here the words of a contract in writing are clear and
unambiguous, its meaning is to be ascertained in accordance with its
plainly expressed intent."4 5
The concurrence also fixated on the parties' intentions. Written by
Justice Ginsburg, and joined by Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and
Kagan, the opinion directed the Sixth Circuit to search for the
"intention of the parties." Further the concurrence noted that "clear
and express language" is not necessary to prove that the parties
intended lifetime benefits.47
The Supreme Court is not alone in invoking the "intention of the
parties" lore in gap cases. For example, in cases of changed
37. Int'l Union, UAW v. Yard-Man, Inc., 716 F.2d 1476 (6th Cir. 1983), abrogated by
M& G Polymers, 135 S. Ct. 926 (2015).
38. M& G Polymers, 135 S. Ct. at 933.
39. Hillman, Supreme Court, supra note 33, at 312-13.
40. M& G Polymers, 135 S. Ct. at 937.
41. Id.
42. Id at 933.
43. Id (quoting 11 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 30:2 (4th ed.
2012)).
44. Id at 935 (emphasis added) (quoting LORD, supra note 43, § 30:2).
45. Id. at 933 (quoting LORD, supra note 43, § 30:6).
46. Id at 937 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (quoting LORD, supra note 43, § 30:2).
47. Id. at 937-38.
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circumstances, where at the bargaining and drafting stages the parties
clearly never contemplated an issue, courts nonetheless profess to find
the parties' intentions.48 This is nothing but contract lore.
C. Promises Are Enforceable Only if They Are Supported by
Consideration
Students of contract law learn early in their legal education that
the law enforces promises if part of a "bargained-for exchange."'49 A
bargain requires that the promisor extracts something, called
"consideration" from the promisee in exchange for the promise." Gift
promises, on the other hand, in which there is no return consideration,
are not legally enforceable." But students have a lot more to learn about
enforceable promises. The reality is that promise enforcement is
dramatically different than the bargain theory lets on. To be clear, I'm
not arguing that contracts people perceive that promises are solely
enforced if part of a bargain. Promissory estoppel, for example, is so
well established, that contracts people acknowledge it openly, although
some analysts may be overly enthusiastic about its significance.5 2
Instead, I argue that the bargain theory is so incoherent that it is no
theory at all:
The bargain theory is neither descriptively nor normatively very
coherent.... Courts sometimes police the adequacy of consideration
despite contract law's freedom-of-contract norm to leave that issue to the
parties. Courts enforce gift promises that induce reliance or for a benefit
already received despite the absence of a bargain. Courts enforce without
consideration contract modifications, option contracts, waivers, and
promises made to charitable institutions. Courts enforce promises even
if the return consideration is only an ephemeral reason for making the
promise. Courts manipulate or dispense with consideration if they
48. See, e.g., Haines v. City of New York, 364 N.E.2d 820 (N.Y. 1977).
49.
In these essays the premise will be that bargain consideration has been and will
remain for a long time to come a central feature of our law of contract, central in the
sense that it provides a strong affirmative reason for enforcing promises, the reason
that is by a wide margin the most often used, though it is not the only one.
JoHN P. DAwsoN, GITs AND PROMISES: CONTINENTAL AND AMERICAN LAW COMPARED 3
(1980).
50. See, e.g., Baehr v. Penn-O-Tex Oil Corp., 104 N.W.2d 661, 665-66 (Minn. 1960).
51. Id. at 665.
52. See Charles L. Knapp, Reliance in the Revised Restatement: The Proliferation of
Promissory Estoppel, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 52, 53 (1981) ("[T]he principle of section 90 . .. has
become perhaps the most radical and expansive development of this century in the law of
promissory liability.").
910 [Vol. 94:903
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believe a gift promise is important enough to enforce. Consideration to
support a promise can come from a party other than the promisee .... No
wonder Professor Grant Gilmore was moved to announce the wholesale
demise of the bargain theory of consideration.3
The bargain theory survives because it helps (a little) to draw the
distinction between promises that should be enforced and those that
should be left to the promisor's conscience.5 4 As such, the theory acts
as a minimal gatekeeper, deterring the enforcement of promises where
the cost of enforcement outweighs the benefit. But to say that contract
law requires a distinct, cognizable bargain is nothing more than
contract lore."
III. WHY CONTRACT LORE?
The discussion in this Part describes various possible explanations
for contract lore. I am not wedded to any one of them, but believe that
some of them are plausible in particular contexts and, perhaps, not in
others. Nor is any one of the explanations that follow the only possible
reason for contract lore in a particular context. Nevertheless,
considering the reasons behind contract lore creates a better
understanding of contract law.
A. Cognitive Dissonance
Previously, I concluded that important counter-principles and
policies stood in the way of enforcement of contract lore. For example,
53. Robert A. Hillman & Maureen A. O'Rourke, Rethinking Consideration in the
Electronic Age, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 311, 321 (2009) [hereinafter Hillman, Consideration]
(footnotes omitted); see also Baehr, 104 N.W.2d at 665 (noting the bargain theory "is a crude
and not altogether successful attempt to generalize the conditions under which promises will
be legally enforced").
54. DAWSON, supra note 49, at 2-4.
55. Another example of contract lore is that lawyers in long-term business contracts
draft performance obligations precisely and allocate risks optimally. Ian Macneil's insight that
in reality parties and their lawyers rely on norms to govern their "relational" agreements uch
as cooperation and flexibility is a more accurate description of the real world. See generally
Ian R. Macneil, Relational Contract Theory: Challenges and Queries, 94 N.w. U. L. REV. 877,
879-80 (2000) (discussing contract behavioral patterns and norms); Ian R. Macneil, Relational
Contract: What We Do and Do Not Know, 1985 Wis. L. REv. 483 (1985) (discussing the
complexity of human interactions and their effects on legal scholarship and developments).
Still another example is the lore that after a material breach injured contracting parties can
cancel the contract and seek a remedy for unjust enrichment that is independent of the contract
and measured by benefit conferred. The reality is that the contract rate is likely the best
evidence of the benefit conferred and thus contract sneaks in through the back door. See, e.g.,
Joseph M. Perillo, Restitution in a Contractual Context, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 1208, 1215-16
(1973).
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the rule that injured parties get their expectancy runs into counter-
principles and policies, including the following:
We do not want to discourage parties from exercising their right to a day
in court for fear of having to pay the other party's legal fees. We do not
want to license courts to award baseless recoveries, so we require injured
parties to prove their damages with some precision.56
In addition, we want to encourage disclosure of a contract party's
special circumstances so we deny unforeseeable consequential
damages.17 Further, we encourage contract-making by ensuring that
promisors do not face unlimited liability."
Based on the new examples of contract lore presented here, we
can add additional counter-principles and policies that stand in the way
of freedom of contract. For example, contract law enforces reasonable
standard forms, not because consumers have consented to them, but
because standard forms reduce costs and therefore facilitate exchange
that, on the whole, benefits society. Contract law fills gaps in contracts
and enforces them, not because they further contractual intent, but
because doing so avoids the costs of contract breakdown. Contract law
recites the requirement of a bargained-for-exchange to enforce a
promise, not because the consideration construct is a neat way of
distinguishing enforceable from unenforceable promises, but because
we need a strategy (with all of its flaws) for distinguishing them.
But why is proclaiming the veracity of contract lore so prevalent
among judges, lawyers, and scholars, who actually know better?59 For
example, why don't they just admit that contract damages do not make
the injured party whole because of the important counter-principles and
56. Hillman, Lore I, supra note 1, at 508 (footnote omitted).
57. Id. & n.23 (citing Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete
Contracts: An Economic Theory ofDefault Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 101 (1989)).
58. A host of exceptions also swallow up the lore that the reasons for breach are
irrelevant and that the parties' intentions control. For example, people should keep their
promises, and intentional breaches deserve moral approbation. And deterring opportunistic
breaches "encourages contracting and thwarts useless wealth transfers from an innocent party
to a wrongdoer. Perhaps most obvious, judges and juries are human beings who cannot help
but be influenced by the degree of nastiness and inconsiderateness of a breach." Id at 510
(internal footnote omitted).
Contract law applies an objective test of intentions, meaning what a reasonable person
would believe are the intentions, not what either party internally believes are the contract terms.
The objective test assures that promisees can rely on a reasonable interpretation of the contract,
not what the promisor secretly intended or what that party carelessly said or did. Id. at 511-12.
59. For example, why do some analysts and courts insist that fault plays no role in
contract enforcement? See, e.g., Bodum USA, Inc. v. La Cafetiere, Inc., 621 F.3d 624, 634 (7th
Cir. 2010) (Posner, J., concurring).
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policies? Previously, I dismissed certain explanations. For example, I
argued that contract lore is not merely countenancing a series of
exceptions to the general rule.6 0 A good example of rule and exception
is the rule that after a material breach the injured party may exit the
contract and sue for damages.6 1 According to the Restatement (Second)
of Contracts, however, certain material breaches entitle the injured
party only to suspend performance, but not to cancel the contract.62 In
addition, the rule that injured parties must mitigate damages, including
in some instances by dealing further with the breaching party, creates
an exception to the right to cancel.63 But expectancy damages almost
inevitably fail to make an injured party whole, so one cannot insist that
the actual general rule is that they do.'
I also argued that contract lore constitutes more than a series of
legal fictions. According to common usage, legal fictions are conscious
judicial manipulations useful in developing legal principles for the
purpose of achieving particular instrumental goals.5 But contract lore
does not follow this strategy. Lawmakers acknowledge that fictions are
not based in reality, whereas lawmakers and other contracts people
(until reminded otherwise) typically invoke contract lore as an accurate
description of contract law.66 For example, to justify enforcement of
standard forms that for good reason consumers do not read, contracts
people often rely on the "blanket assent" theory that "although
consumers do not read standard terms, so long as their formal
presentation and substance are reasonable, consumers comprehend the
existence of the terms and agree to be bound to them."6 7 So the concept
of "blanket assent" is more than a legal fiction because contracts people
60. Hillman, Lore I, supra note 1, at 512.
61. See, e.g., Process Am., Inc. v. Cynergy Holdings, LLC, 839 F.3d 125, 136 (2d Cir.
2016) ("[A] party's performance under a contract is excused where the other party has
substantially failed to perform its side of the bargain or, synonymously, where that party has
committed a material breach.").
62. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 242 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
63. See, e.g., ROBERTA. HILLMAN, PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT LAW 178 (4th ed. 2018)
[hereinafter HILLMAN, PRINCIPLES].
64. Hillman, Lore I, supra note 1, at 507-08.
65. LoN L. FULLER, LEGAL FICTIONS 53 (1967); Hillman, Lore I, supra note 1, at 513.
66. Hillman, Lore I, supra note 1, at 513.
67. Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard-Form Contracting in the
Electronic Age, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 429, 461 (2002). In the Standard-Form article, we referred
to blanket assent, supplemented by additional policing doctrines, as a "workable solution" to
the problem of standard forms. Id Speaking only for myself, I am now even less confident that
"blanket assent" alone is an adequate solution to the intractable problem of how to treat
standard forms that consumers do not read.
2020] 913
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treat the concept as an accurate description of what justifies enforcing
terms in the consumer standard-form context.
Contract lore is also much more than fables or fairy tales not
worthy of contemplation.68 Contract lore serves important purposes
that I will now detail.
One explanation for contract lore, cognitive dissonance,
heretofore mentioned, captures some of the reason for contract lore.
Contracts people have a strong desire for freedom of contract that
would exist were it not for counter-principles and policies that
constitute barriers to achieving it. "In an ideal world of freedom and
justice, a legal approach to exchange transactions would enforce
parties' actual agreements freely made by parties with equal bargaining
power and information."6 9 I argued that in this world, injured parties
would be made whole, the reasons for breach would be irrelevant, and
courts would enforce the "meeting of the minds" of the parties." I can
now add that consumers would freely and knowingly consent to fair
standard form agreements and the law would nicely delineate what
promises are legally enforceable. But in the real world, substantive
counter-principles and policies stand in the way.71
In fact, cognitive dissonance "may be especially strong
concerning people's 'core values,"' such as freedom of contract and
economic liberty.72 Contracts people simply are more comfortable with
contract lore, and it is more culturally acceptable and legitimating than
the realities of contract law. In fact, our country's core belief in
capitalism that lays the foundation for these contract principles is itself
more lore than law. As one author states: "'Socialism' vs. 'Capitalism'
is a False Dichotomy."73 The U.S. economy "involve[s] a complex mix
of 'capitalist' market institutions and 'socialist' regulatory and
redistributive institutions."74
68. See Macey, supra note 1, at 7-9 ("[Mlyths play an important role in the law and
they deserve to be taken seriously.").




73. Will Wilkinson, "Socialism" vs. "Capitalism" Is a False Dichotomy, Vox (Aug.
16, 2018), https://www.vox.com/the-big-idea/2018/8/16/17698602/socialism-capitalism-false-
dichotomy-kevin-williamson-column-republican-ocasio-cortez
74. Id; see also Marian L. Tupy, Bernie Is Not a Socialist and America Is Not
Capitalist, CATO INsT. (Mar. 1, 2016), https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/bemie-
not-socialist-america-not-capitalist (noting multiple studies that found some young Americans
view socialism favorably).
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Similarly, despite the lore that markets are the "center" of contract
law and provide its normative foundation," in reality freedom of
contract and counter-principles, such as fairness, equality, and morality
"share the contract law spotlight."76 The realities of market
imperfections mean that we cannot achieve a truly free market system,
but we want to believe that we have achieved it.
B. Beyond Cognitive Dissonance
1. Strategic Explanation for Contract Lore
Although cognitive dissonance is part of the mystery of contract
lore," a "one size fits all" explanation is incomplete. For example, the
Critical Legal Studies (CLS) movement, prominent in the 1980s and
1990s, pronounced that much of law is indeterminate, which can give
license to lawmakers to legitimate, consciously or unconsciously,
existing social inequities." In at least some contexts, then, contract lore
may constitute a smoke screen that enables contract "elites" to favor
one class of contractors over another.79
75. See NATHAN B. OMAN, THE DIGNITY OF COMMERCE: MARKETS AND THE MORAL
FOUNDATIONS OF CONTRACT LAW 13-15 (2016). Further, "contract law exists primarily to
support markets." Id. at 38.
76. ROBERT A. HILLMAN, THE RICHNESS OF CONTRACT LAW: AN ANALYSIS AND
CRITIQUE OF CONTEMPORARY THEORIES OF CONTRACT LAW 267 (1997) [hereinafter HILLMAN,
RICHNESS]. In Nathan Oman's provocative book, well worth reading, he writes that we enforce
boilerplate because "doing so strengthens and extends markets." OMAN, supra note 75, at 134.
He relegates consent to a secondary position rather dramatically in boilerplate cases, by arguing
that consent is "attenuated" and "misplaced." Id. Further, boilerplate only requires a "bare
minimum of consent" and the "search for meaningful consent should be abandoned." Id. at
135, 156 (emphasis added). Instead, Oman relies on "the social context in which boilerplate is
written" to limit the possibility of abuse, such as competition and reputational sanctions. Id. at
148, 150-53 (emphasis added).
77. "Once we decide ... that we should ordinarily bolster a private sphere of free
action ... we come to believe that we will find such a sphere out in the world." MARK KELMAN,
A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 291 (1987).
78. For discussions of CLS reasoning and contract law, see HILLMAN, RICHNESS, supra
note 76, at 190-207; Robert W. Gordon, Unfreezing Legal Reality: Critical Approaches to
Law, 15 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 195 (1987); and John Zhuang Liu & Xueyao Li, Legal Techniques
for Rationalizing Biased Judicial Decisions: Evidence from Experiments with Real Judges, 16
J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 630 (2019).
79. But see Hillman, Lore I, supra note 1, at 514-15 (arguing that the CLS position did
not apply as an explanation in most circumstances).
In the context of corporate law, Professor Macey states: "Interestingly, while each of the
canons described here is false as a description of the world, each of them describes the way
that elites would prefer the world to be perceived by non-elites." Macey, supra note 1, at 4-5.
And further, "In a nutshell, these myths serve the palliative role of obscuring the ugly truths
about certain legal rules and depicting them in a more attractive and politically acceptable
light." Id at 8; see also JOSEPH CAMPBELL, PATHWAYS TO BLISS 8 (David Kudler ed., 2004)
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Consider again two of the examples of contract lore presented in
this Article. The Supreme Court majority's seeming hostility to unions
in M & G Polymers arguably supports the CLS theory. As noted, the
majority opinion criticized the Sixth Circuit's use of context evidence,
such as the connection between healthcare benefits and pension
benefits, as "placing a thumb on the scale in favor of vested retiree
benefits in all collective-bargaining agreements."" Calling such
context evidence "speculations," the majority resorted to the contract
lore that the evidence "distort[ed] the attempt 'to ascertain the intention
of the parties."'s1 By discarding this evidence and several other
inferences favorable to the union and relying on or searching for the
party's intentions on the duration of retiree health care benefits when
the facts at trial clearly showed that the parties left a gap with respect
to the issue, the Supreme Court majority arguably demonstrated more
than a poor application of the law, but a strategy to favor business
interests over unions.
And it is not too far of a stretch to argue that courts that espouse
the idea that consumers, who for good reason did not read their
standard forms, still consent to them represents a choice, not to reduce
costs and to facilitate fair transactions, but to favor businesses over
consumers. The CLS insight may ring especially true today to
consumers and employees faced with onerous, take-it-or-leave it terms
in the digital environment.82 "Blanket assent," according to this
interpretation, is nothing more than a useful tool for businesses to
enforce their sometimes onerous terms.83
("[Myths] validate and maintain a certain sociological system: a shared set of rights and
wrongs, proprieties or improprieties, on which [a] particular social unit depends for its
existence.").
80. M & G Polymers USA, LLC v. Tackett, 135 S. Ct. 926,935 (2015); see supra note
39 and accompanying text (discussing additional context evidence). The Court also argued that
the Sixth Circuit wrongly inferred that "when ... parties contract for benefits which accrue
upon achievement of retiree status, there is an inference that the parties likely intended those
benefits to continue as long as the beneficiary remains a retiree." M& G Polymers, 135 S. Ct.
at 935 (quoting Int'l Union v. Yard-Man, Inc., 716 F.2d 1476, 1482 (6th Cir. 1983)). Although
such reasoning is not conclusive, the contract's reference to retirement benefits is at least
probative of duration. See Hillman, Supreme Court, supra note 33, at 312-15.
81. M& G Polymers, 135 S. Ct. at 935 (emphasis omitted) (quoting LORD, supra note
43, § 30:2).
82. See Hillman, Supreme Court, supra note 33, at 321-22. In another context, I wrote
that "[AT&T Mobility LLC v.] Concepcion simply reveals five justices' preference for
enforcing standard terms, even if presented on a take-it-or-leave-it basis and under the cloud
of fraud, and their quite passionate dislike of class actions." HILLMAN, PRINCIPLES, supra note
63, at 254.
83. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
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However, other examples of contract lore do not fit neatly in the
CLS legitimation-of-the-status-quo explanation. For example, the CLS
theory does not help explain why contracts people support the bargain
theory as a coherent method of distinguishing enforceable from
unenforceable promises, but at the same time acknowledge the rise of
promissory estoppel as an alternative theory for enforcing promises.
Early cases denying enforcement of promises that induced detrimental
reliance reflected judicial uneasiness with the injustice of the result.84
Not surprisingly, cases manipulating the idea of consideration in such
settings began to arise in large numbers." Promissory estoppel then
progressed to enforce promises relied on in business settings if an
agreement was unenforceable, and then to enforce relied-on promises
and representations made at the negotiation stage. In each instance, a
large number of the cases reflected judicial concern for the underdog,
not an effort to legitimate existing hierarchies.86
If the CLS explanation holds weight in some contexts, contract
lore is not always understood as a series of aspirations consistent with
freedom of choice. Instead, contract lore may have a more ominous
goal of making the law seem more palatable to the citizenry, but at its
expense.
2. Changes in Circumstances as an Explanation for Contract Lore
Another explanation for contract lore lays blame on lawmakers
for unconsciously extending contract law to new, but unsuitable,
horizons. For example, Kar and Radin explain the uncomfortable
treatment of standard forms as the result of changes in technology and
84. See, e.g., Kirksey v. Kirksey, 8 Ala. 131, 133 (1845) (noting the "loss and
inconvenience" a widow suffered after moving in reliance on her brother-in-law's promise to
provide housing to her and her children); see also Local 1330, United Steel Workers v. U.S.
Steel Corp., 631 F.2d 1264, 1265 (1980) (noting the effect the closure of two steel plants had
on the local town).
85. See, e.g., Seavey v. Drake, 62 N.H. 393, 393 (1882) ("Equity protects a parol gift
of land equally with a parol agreement o sell it, if accompanied by possession, and if the donee,
induced by the promise to give it, has made valuable improvements on the property."); Ryerss
v. Trs. of the Presbyterian Congregation of Blossburg, 33 Pa. 114, 114 (1859) ("An action may
be maintained on a promise to subscribe a certain amount towards the building of a church
86. See, e.g., Wheeler v. White, 398 S.W.2d 93, 96 (Tex. 1965) ("The vital principle
is that he who by his language or conduct leads another to do what he would not otherwise
have done, shall not subject such person to loss or injury by disappointing the expectations
upon which he acted." (quoting Dickerson v. Colgrove, 100 U.S. 578, 580 (1879)); Hoffman
v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 133 N.W.2d 267, 268-70 (Wis. 1965) (noting that a baker sold his
bakery in reliance on representations that Red Owl would build a store for the baker to operate).
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the attempt by courts to extend "traditional" contract law to reach the
new realities.8 7 They call this an "unconscious paradigm slip" in which
"many courts and scholars now assume that all boilerplate text
contributes 'terms' to a 'contract' in largely unproblematic ways akin
to the simpler uses of language to form contracts in 1883.""
3. Benign Additional Explanations for Contract Lore
Additional possible explanations for contract lore are more
benign. Perhaps in some contexts contract lore is a necessary
simplification of complex legal principles in order to help educate
people about the law and to implement it.89 For example, the myriad
judicial sources of contractual gap filling may lead contracts people to
want to simplify the analysis. In addition, contracts people may ignore
fault as a factor for determining breach of contract to avoid the need to
explain precisely the kinds of performance conduct that contract law
either condones or rejects.
Of course, there are costs to simplifying explanations of the law.
Lawyers must exercise care in advising clients for fear of conveying
poor advice based on lore and not law. For example, lawyers should
advise their clients who are contemplating breach of the possibility that
their conduct may play a role in the measurement of damages or may
even lead to a finding of an independent ort.90
Contract lore may also increase the efficiency of exchange
transactions by channeling contract parties' actions in efficient ways.
For example, in union-company negotiations, the parties' strategy of
avoiding the issue of the duration of retiree healthcare benefits led to
years of costly and time-consuming litigation.91 If courts mistakenly
look for the parties' intentions in gap-filling cases, and in unpredictable
ways, perhaps lawyers may advise their clients to avoid known gaps
such as duration, despite the challenge of reaching agreement on the
issue.
87. "The changes in technology that have been altering how people communicate to
form contracts began incrementally but have accumulated over time-with especially large
transformations gathering over the last two decades." Kar & Radin, supra note 23, at 1140.
88. Id. at 1142.
89. But see Hillman, Lore I, supra note 1, at 514 (arguing that contract lore does not
arise solely because attorneys simplify their explanations of the law to their clients).
90. See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text; see also Mauldin v. Sheffer, 150
S.E.2d 150 (Ga. Ct. App. 1966) (noting that neglect of a legal duty other than the specific
obligation of the contract can result in the committing of a tort).
91. Hillman, Supreme Court, supra note 33, at 324-25.
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Contract law's move to enforce option contracts in the absence of
real consideration is another example of an efficient outcome. In option
contracts for the sale of real property, for example, a promise to leave
an offer open for the sale of the property for a particular period of time
is enforceable notwithstanding that the promise is not supported by real
consideration.9 2 Contracts people understood that options are a socially
useful transaction that provides an important substantive basis for
enforcing them despite the absence of real consideration." In short,
under the cover of consideration, "twentieth-century courts enforced
promises that increased society's welfare, interpreted broadly, and that
were capable of judicial administration."94 But as we will see in the
next Part, perhaps clarifying the meaning and role of consideration
would ultimately improve contract law.
IV. WHAT CAN WE LEARN FROM FOCUSING ON CONTRACT LORE?
A study of contract lore leads to a better understanding of potential
areas of law reform. For example, I have already noted that a clearer
explanation of the important role of fault in contract law would
motivate lawyers to better caution clients contemplating breach of
contract.9 5 Reformers should also consider whether contract law should
rebalance the principles and policies of expectancy damages to assure
that injured parties receive just compensation. For example, are the
certainty and foreseeability barriers to damages too stringent?96 I will
now suggest additional issues for law reformers.
A. Internet Standard Forms
Most obviously in need of further thought is the enforcement of
standard-form Internet contracts. Current proposed solutions seem
unsatisfactory. For example, although intriguing, Kar and Radin's
"common meaning" approach would dramatically bog down
92. See, e.g., Marsh v. Lott, 97 P. 163, 165 (Cal. Ct. App. 1908) ("[A]ny money
consideration, however small, paid and received for an option to purchase property at its
adequate value is binding upon the seller...."); see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 87(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
93. Hillman, Consideration, supra note 53, at 322.
94. Id
95. Hillman, Lore I, supra note 1, at 517.
96. I also questioned the efficient breach theory. The premise of the theory is that
contract law makes the injured party whole. If contract law rarely if ever does so, the efficient




consumer-business exchanges in a context where lawmakers should be
mindful of the need to facilitate them (but fairly). Further, I doubt that
decision makers successfully could identify the terms that the thought
process Kar and Radin suggest would yield.97 In short, I think it is a
reach to think as Kar and Radin do that in standard-form litigation the
"common meaning" of the parties is ascertainable based on the
cooperative use of language by the parties in interpersonal conversation
during contract formation.98
Other suggestions are also problematic. The law could require
consumers to click "I agree" next to each standard term or at least each
problematic one. This would be cumbersome for consumers, and
lawmakers would face a challenge identifying the terms that require
consumers' extra attention.99 Another approach, set forth in the latest
draft of the new Restatement of Consumer Contracts, is to discount the
consent requirement and weigh more heavily whether particular
provisions are unconscionable."'o This approach would depend on
greater judicial policing of standard forms through the rubric of
unconscionability and, perhaps, related octrines, but heretofore such
an approach has shown little promise.' Another proposal is to
establish a government agency that would review terms.102 Such an
approach would create serious incursions on freedom of contract,
potentially beyond what is required to protect consumers.
The Principles of the Law ofSoftware Contracts, promulgated by
the American Law Institute, incentivizes licensors to disclose their
terms on the Internet before a consumer initiates a transaction. The
theory is that negative publicity, possibly generated by watchdog
websites that collect suspect terms, would encourage licensors to draft
reasonable ones."0 ' Perhaps one step in this direction that holds some
promise would be to create and support more such websites that collect
97. See supra notes 25-29 and accompanying text.
98. Kar & Radin, supra note 23, at 1147-48; see Ian Ayres & Gregory Klass,
Response, One-Legged Contracting, 133 HARV. L. REv. F. 1 (2019).
99. Hillman & Barakat, supra note 22, at 26.
100. RESTATEMENT OF CONSUMER CONTRACTS § 5 (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft
2019).
101. Unconscionability is too amorphous a term and is troublesome to judges when it
collides with their perception of freedom of contract. See, e.g., Larry A. DiMatteo & Bruce
Louis Rich, A Consent Theory of Unconscionability: An Empirical Study ofLaw in Action, 33
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1067, 1100 (2006) ("[R]eveal[ing] that unconscionability claims are
difficult to win.").
102. See, e.g., Clayton P. Gillette, Preapproved Boilerplate, in BOILERPLATE: THE
FOUNDATION OF MARKET CONTRACTS 95 (Omri Ben-Shahar ed., 2007).
103. See ALI SOFTWARE PRINCIPLES, supra note 21, at 115-16, 121-43.
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one-sided terms and identify the businesses that use them. But it
remains to be seen whether such resources would increase consumer
shopping for terms.104
B. Gap Cases
Courts should surrender their predilection to resort to the
"intentions of the parties" rubric when it is clear the parties left a gap.
Instead, courts should investigate and develop the appropriate gap filler
in the particular context. Gap filler sources include efficiency, fairness
(taking into account, for example, bargaining power and comparative
gains and losses of the parties), and what the parties would have done
if they had agreed to a gap filler. Penalty defaults also are a source of
gap filling that create incentives to share information."
Admittedly, selecting the appropriate gap filler in a particular case
will not be easy. For example, if courts fill the gap on the duration of
healthcare benefits by finding that the benefits vest on retirement,
healthcare providers may be discouraged from offering retirement
plans to employees and unions in the first place. On the other hand,
such a gap filler might help companies recruit and maintain an efficient
workforce. Perhaps, the most appropriate approach to this problem
would be, not all or nothing, but a gap filler that takes both sides'
interest in mind. Healthcare benefits would vest upon retirement, but
companies would be free to reasonably change the amount of
protection based on their economic situation.1 06
But such difficulties should not license courts to hide behind the
"intentions of the parties" myth. Contract law should be as transparent
as possible to help guide planners and drafters and, for that matter,
courts facing such questions for the first time.
C. The Many Theories of Promise Enforcement
Lawmakers should concede more readily that consideration
theory is not much of a theory at all. Doing so would help judges reach
104. The lack of consumer reading of terms is well-documented. See, e.g., Hillman &
Rachlinski, supra note 67, at 433. There may be little reason to believe that consumers would
expend energy comparing terms even if collected and labeled problematic. If businesses
believe the potential is low, they may not be moved to avoid one-sided terms.
105. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 57, at 97-100.




hard decisions that are obfuscated by the need to show a bargained-for
exchange.
For example, consider the issue of whether licenses of open
source software are enforceable contracts if the licensor does not
charge a fee for the software.10 7 To simplify, focus on the General
Public License (GPL). This license authorizes licensees to transfer,
copy, or modify the software, but not without restrictions usually
referred to as "terms of use."os Examples of terms of use in the GPL
include the requirement that licensees reveal the source code to their
transferees and use the same GPL terms upon transfer of the software
to these licensees.' Is the GPL a contract between licensors and
licensees that accept the terms so that the licensee has an obligation to
abide by the restrictions?o An analysis based on bargained-for
exchange simply gums up the works. On the one hand, one can argue
that the licensee has supplied no consideration to support the use of the
free software-the transaction is a gift with conditions. On the other,
an agreement by the licensee to the restrictions may suffice as
consideration:
Terms of use ... are not necessary to convey software and therefore
constitute consideration under general contract law if at least part of the
vendor's motive (however insubstantial), judged objectively, is to extract
agreement o the terms of use. Vendors in the open source movement
make no secret about their desire to create a new paradigm of openness,
to enhance the freedom and capabilities of software users, to foster
innovation, and to create public acceptance and familiarity with their
intellectual property framework. The motive to further one or more of
these goals, without more, should be sufficient to satisfy the bargain
requirement. But often there is more. A licensor may benefit indirectly,
for example, by entering lucrative service and update contracts or by
gaining publicity for other more ntrepreneurial projects. Even without
such benefits, collaborators work in a "'gift culture' in which members
107.
The principal goal of the open source intellectual property regime is to maximize the
ongoing use, growth, development, and distribution of free software. To achieve that
goal, this regime shifts the fundamental optic of intellectual property rights away
from protecting the prerogatives of an author toward protecting the prerogatives of
generations of users.
STEVEN WEBER, THE SUCCESS OF OPEN SOURCE 84 (2004).
108. See, e.g., Hillman, Consideration, supra note 53, at 325-28.
109. Id
110. Id. at 328. The licensor could also bring an action based on infringement of
intellectual property rights, which is beyond our subject here.
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compete for status by giving things away." Contract law ... long has
recognized that a motive to increase one's standing as opposed to pure
altruism may be sufficient to constitute consideration. Further,
developers learn state-of-the-art technology and gain prestige by
participating in the open source movement. Thus, consideration supports
open source software license grants under traditional contract law."'
Perhaps it is not too much of a reach to suggest that instead of
going through the paces of looking for consideration (as my coauthor
and I did in the quotation above), which for businesspeople may lead
to endless costly litigation,'12 contract law should stop manipulating
consideration theory and enforce promises that increase welfare and are
capable ofjudicial administration (at least in the context of open source
software and other transactions that stand at the border-line of
consideration). Enforceable promises in the open source realm
presumptively would include commercial promises made with the
intent to be legally enforceable.1 13
V. CONCLUSION
I have added three new examples of contract lore in this Article.
The reader might think that almost nothing is what it seems in contract
law. But that is not my aim, nor do I think that is true. Nor was my goal
to evaluate the normative correctness of particular contract law
outcomes. Instead, my goal was to reinforce the view that significant
contract lore exists, and to consider what we can learn from it.114
111. Id. at 328-29 & n.103 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Jyh-An Lee, New Perspectives
on Public Goods Production: Policy Implications of Open Source Software, 9 VAND. J. ENT.
& TECH. L. 45, 54 (2006)).
112. See, e.g., Jacobsen v. Katzer, 535 F.3d 1373, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (finding
"collaborative work" consideration for the right "to copy, modify and distribute the software
code subject to conditions").
113. Germany, for example, does not require consideration to enforce the GPL. Sapna
Kumar, Enforcing the GNU GPL, 2006 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 1, 26.
114. See Macey, supra note 1, at 24 ("[T]he argument here is about what the law is
perceived to be.").
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